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Abstract 
 
The hypothesis is put forward that, after three decades of stability, there is 
now the prospect of significant change in the vertical and horizontal 
structure of the mobile market place. On the supply side, significant 
factors are, first,  the availability of a new and very powerful form of 
mobile connectivity in the shape of 5G, and second, software defined 
networking, which allows a single network to provide a variety of 
heterogeneous services or ‘slices’. On the demand side, the digital 
transformation of the whole economy (and not just the communications 
sector) creates the need for diverse communications functions operating 
in a universe with a much wider set of digitally transformed services. 
 
 Mobile operators will find themselves contesting customer relationship 
with firms or other organisations providing these services in an integrated 
fashion, and thus risk replacing their direct link with end users with 
becoming the wholesale supplier of an expanded but ‘commoditised’ 
communications product. We may also observe fewer radio access 
networks; more competitive backhaul; and the (partial) vertical 
disintegration of mobile network operators. The regulatory changes 
implied may include heavier regulation of fewer RANs, and the need for 
market analyses to confront situations in which network operators sell 
more and more of their services to fewer and fewer end users, and to  a 
variety of heterogeneous content and application providers – some of 
them exercising substantial levels of  market power.  
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1. Introduction. 
 
 
The rather speculative and bald hypothesis of this article can be quickly 
stated. After three decades in which the competitive structure of the 
mobile industry has been largely unchanged - years in which four 
generations of mobile technology have glided past, and in which the 
traditional voice product has been supplemented and even overtaken by 
data services – there is now the prospect of significant change in the 
vertical and horizontal structure of the mobile sector. 
 
This arises from a confluence of factors. On the supply side, there is the 
availability of a new and very powerful form of mobile connectivity in 
the shape of 5G. This will be based from the outset on software defined 
networking, which allows a single network to provide a variety of 
heterogeneous services or ‘slices’. On the demand side, the digital 
transformation of the whole economy (and not just the communications 
sector) creates the need for diverse communications functions operating 
in an environment containing many more digitally transformed services. 
Mobile operators will find themselves contesting customer relationship 
with respect to these services with firms or other organisations providing 
them in an integrated fashion, and thus risk replacing their direct link 
with end users with becoming the wholesale supplier of a ‘commoditised’ 
communication product, though they may continue directly to provide a 
limited overall connectivity function.       
 
I conjecture that this may lead to a number of structural effects, 
including:  
- fewer radio access networks (or RANs) 
- more competitive backhaul and a more prominent role for content 
distribution networks (CDNs) 
- the partial vertical disintegration of mobile phone companies 
- the partial loss by mobile networks of their relationship with the end 
customer in communications services and their partial relegation to the 
subsidiary role of providing wholesale services to others providers. 
 
The regulatory changes implied may include: 
- heavier regulation of fewer RANs 
- further competition in backhaul and core markets  
- the need for market analyses to confront situations in which 
network operators sell more and more of their services to a variety 
of heterogeneous  content and application providers, and fewer and 
fewer services to end users.  
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2. The unexpected structural stability of the mobile industry. 
 
The competitive structure of the mobile communications industry has 
been relatively unchanged over its lifetime. It continues to have a ‘small 
numbers’ market structure – the exact number of operators in each 
jurisdiction waxing and (in recent years) waning. Firms have generally 
persisted in the market, despite discrete merger and acquisition activity, 
and have seamlessly adapted to the successive generations of technology 
and to the transition for voice to voice and data services. New network 
entry has proved difficult in increasingly saturated markets, although a 
growing number of services  are now contested between mobile network 
operators (MNOs) and  OTTs (over the tops).   
  
Mobile operators are much less regulated than fixed operators, despite 
concerns about explicit and tacit collusion. The burden of structural 
regulation falls on spectrum awards, which increasingly have involved 
interventions such as spectrum caps or set asides for new entrants, and 
merger control. With the exception of international roaming, retail price 
control is rarely employed, and wholesale price controls are largely 
confined to mobile voice termination.  
 
A significant change relevant to the later discussion concerns increased 
infrastructure sharing by MNOs. This was first resisted by competition 
authorities, on the ground that it might lead to further unwanted or 
unlawful co-operation, but starting with towers and other passive assets it 
now sometimes extends to sharing electronic components and spectrum.    
 
The smart phone-fuelled extension of the value chain over the past fifteen 
years into much heavier reliance on external rather than home-made 
content – video, social media, search etc. – has made a big difference, as 
has the presence in the market place of powerful new over the tops 
(OTTs), often in the form of multi-sided platforms like Facebook or 
Google. These both complement and compete with mobile network 
operators (MNOs). When they compete, pressure mounts on the regulator 
to level the playing field. Section4 below also discusses the growth of 
content distribution networks (CDNs).  
 
The UK provides a particularly strong example of the structural stability 
of the mobile industry, down to the level of individual firms. Thus the 
genealogy of the current four UK MNOs in 2018 is shown in box 1. 
                                      ------------------------------ 
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Box 1. Ownership changes in the UK mobile market 
 
EE (Everything Everywhere): acquired by BT in 2016, from a joint venture 
consummated in 2010 which combined France Telecom’s  Orange  and Deutsche 
Telekom’ T-Mobile; FT bought Orange in 2000 from Vodafone; which acquired it 
through its purchase in 2000 of Mannesmann; which bought it in 1999 from 
Hutchison Whampoa; which bought it from the original licensees (including British 
Aerospace); which launched  its operations in 1993.  Deutsche Telekom acquired and 
in 2002 rebranded as T-Mobile the mobile operator previously known as Mercury 
One-to-One, which started operations in 1994 under the ownership of Cable & 
Wireless.   
 
O2: acquired by Telefonica from  BT  in 2006 ; BT was (with Vodafone) one of two 
inaugural cellular  mobile licensees in 1984, trading under the name ‘Cellnet’ in a 
joint venture with Securicor, which sold its stake to BT in 1999; it sought 
unsuccessfully to merge with Three in 2016. 
 
Three: owned by Hutchison Whampoa,  Three  entered the market as the fifth 3G 
licensee in 2003; it sought unsuccessfully to merge with O2 in 2016. 
 
Vodafone UK:  one of two inaugural cellular mobile operators  in 1985, originally 
owned by Racal electronics and subsequently floated off; no subsequent change in 
ownership.  
 
                                      --------------------------------------------- 
 
This shows dizzying changes in the ownership of operators - which 
involved both BT and Hutchison Whampoa starting up or buying and 
then selling one operator, before re-entering the market via another. But 
after the end of the mobile duopoly in 1993/94 (and ignoring start-up 
periods for the three later operators), the market shares of each of the four 
or five operators in existence fluctuated almost entirely in the 15-40% 
range. The combined share of MVNOs has never exceeded 15%. In short 
- a copy-book ‘tight oligopoly’ of vertically integrated firms, latterly 
qualified by an increasing degree of network sharing.  
 
 
3. The supply side: relevant aspects of 5G 
 
Pinning down the nature of 5G really presents more serious difficulties 
than was the case with earlier generations. The key changes with 5G are 
increases in speed and decreases in latency. According to the European 
Commission, 4G data rates (which are typically shared across multiple 
users in the same cell) are about 500 Mb/s with evolution scenarios for 
going up to 3Gb/s. Target applications for enhanced mobile broadband go 
up to aggregated speeds of 10Gb/s – the 5G target set by the ITU. 
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These will require fibre-like radio access, probably using higher 
frequency bands than the sub-6 GHz in current use, and the use of beam–
forming technologies.
4
 It may be necessary to accommodate many 
simultaneous communications by densely-packed users or devices (up to 
1 million per square km.) engaged in what has been christened massive 
machine-type communications, with large numbers of connected devices 
used in professional (eg health) or industrial applications or in smart 
cities,  also involving large populations of sensors.  
 
A second requirement for some uses is instant response time. Core 5G 
applications are said to require latency of the order of 1ms, as compared 
with 10 to 20 ms provided by 4G. These are claimed to be needed for 
such purposes as health care, connected cars, and detection of faults in 
energy systems. These uses will combine 5G with mobile cloud 
technology to meet the more exacting end-to-end response times.  
 
This will not happen overnight. As Lemstra (2018) observes, there are 
two different conceptions of 5G. Under the qualified version, 5G utilises 
its greater spectrum efficiency and lower costs to produce a cheaper and 
better version of 4G services – in particular enhanced mobile broadband. 
In the expansive version, not only the capacity but the scope of 
applications changes radically. Initially, the coverage of the qualified 
version will dominate that of the expansive version. The balance will then 
alter, at a different pace in different countries 
 
Two major consequences follow from these characteristics. The first is 
the need for more and different spectrum. Existing mobile spectrum lies 
uniformly below 6GHz, and mostly below 3GHz. Many (but not all) 
commentators believe it is running out.  
 
Additionally, higher bands are more suited for high speed 
communications. The existence of high demand areas is likely to require 
spectrum regulators everywhere to make the necessary assignments, 
which may require appropriate adjustments to spectrum management 
practices (which are not discussed here). Because higher frequencies 
reduce transmission range, many more base stations may be required – a 
process which has been christened ‘densification’.  
  
A comparison of numbers of base stations in different countries shows 
the large difference between actual and projected cell sites per thousand 
                                                 
4
 Beam-forming  is already used in TD-LTE systems, which are seen as a stepping 
stone to 5G. 
 6 
 
population. The higher numbers in Asia than in Europe and the US are 
also demonstrated in overall terms, and in an even greater superiority of 
Asia in small cell sites. One explanation of these data is that it costs 
between ten and twenty times more to operate a site in the US and Europe 
than in Asia (New Street Research, 2016).
5
 Thus the incremental costs of 
densification vary across the world, and this will affect mobile players’ 
ability to compete in 5G. The existence of high demand areas is likely to 
require spectrum regulators everywhere to make the necessary 
assignments.   
 
The argument has been made that in some countries the costs of installing 
small cells is so large, and the incremental revenues for so doing so small, 
that they are not a commercially viable proposition (Webb 2017).  
 
Conditions for the development of 5G in certain Asian countries, notably 
China, Korea and Japan, are propitious – according to New Street 
Research (2018) – from some or all of a range of factors including their 
endowment of dense networks, a strong early demand case, and an 
environment supported by a clear industrial policy .  
  
In the US, the focus is on a laissez-faire approach, with early unrestricted 
spectrum awards (Pai 2017). In Europe, a much more dirigiste approach 
is followed, with a 5G action plan heavily linked to the Digital Single 
Market (European Commission, 2016a).     
 
There are further linked technical developments which have implications 
which go much wider than mobile networks. They have been trialled on 
4G but are available for implementing on 5G from the outset.  
 
The first is software defined networking (SDN).
6
 This transfers the 
functionality needed in the network such as switching and handover from 
hardware to software, enabling variation in services and functionality to 
be made more readily. 
 
The second is network function virtualisation (NFV). This involves 
implementing the functions of the communications infrastructure in 
software running on standard computing equipment, following the 
precedent of data centres, which have gone through a similar 
transformation. This reduces costs, and simplifies the addition of new 
services. The framework for these developments has been standardised by 
                                                 
5
 The US and the EU are committed to dealing with this problem 
6
 These developments, and their implications, are discussed in Feasey (2016).  
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bodies such as ETSI. The thrust of this development in the mobile sector 
is to strengthen the trend towards the heterogeneity of network provision, 
the implications of which are discussed below.  
 
The combination of these two advances allows network resources to be 
decentrally controlled by third parties which manage their own physical 
or virtual resources individually as needed to meet their own 
requirements. This is often described as ‘network slicing’.  
 
 
4. The demand side: digital transformation   
 
At some risk of exaggeration, one might say that the only sector which 
has been subject to a complete and literal digital transformation is the 
communications sector. This has been accomplished by several means. 
Initially, the digitisation of the communications transport layer, beginning 
in the 1970s with digital core networks and completed later with the 
growth of IP networks and the progressive abandonment of analogue 
broadcasting. This has permitted the drastic changes which have occurred 
in the distribution of traditional cultural and media content, from music to 
news to books, accompanied by the development of completely new 
platform-based services including search and social media. 
 
However other sectors lag behind – but perhaps not for long. This is 
recognised in studies by strategy consultants, too numerous to count, of 
the forthcoming global, regional or sectoral digital transformation. In a 
more general fashion the World Bank (2016) World Development Report 
Digital Dividends imaginatively analysed the impact of these processes 
with a focus on less developed countries.  
 
A more important factor given our interest in structural disruptions is the 
nature of the demand. This takes us into the territory of ‘verticals’ - a 
term of art used in discussions of 5G to describe the emergence, as the 
process of digitisation of the economy develops, of tailored services 
relying on mobile (or fixed) connectivity and offered by private or public 
sector providers. Key and widely cited examples, in the provision of both 
public and  private, and marketed and non-marketed services, are found 
in the following sectors: agriculture, automotive and transport, education, 
energy, financial services,  financial services, government administration, 
health, manufacturing, and ‘smart cities.’  
 
A key feature of this extended list of services is that communication is 
not their raison d’être; nor is the communications component necessarily 
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a major component of total costs. A plethora of organisations already 
provide the (largely) pre-digitalised service. There is thus room for 
conflict (or co-operation) over which organisation has the crucial contact 
with the end user, which in the case of marketed services is often a 
lucrative  source of rents within the value chain, arising from consumer 
lack of engagement or bounded rationality – sometimes called a 
‘confusopoly’, or a more traditional oligopoly.  
 
A vivid example of these conflicts is currently on show in relation to 
connected cars, part of the ‘automotive’ vertical (Ramberg (2017) and 
Financial Times (2017)). Connected cars (to be distinguished from 
autonomous – ‘driverless’ -  cars ) are those that have access to the 
Internet and a variety of sensors, and are thus able to send and receive 
signals, sense the physical environment around them, and interact with 
other vehicles or entities.  
 
In 2017, the forms of connectivity at issue include limited real-time car-
to-car communications services (for example to avoid collisions by co-
ordinated braking). In this regard the car makers favour a short range wifi 
Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) technology requiring a dedicated spectrum 
band and a bespoke and comparatively readily constructed network. The 
telecoms companies’ alternative is a long-range cellular network, the 
availability of which is dependent on the wider roll-out of 5G networks, 
where 5G may be a longer-lasting technology, capable of adapting to 
subsequent higher levels of automation. There are also solutions which 
involve interoperability between the two technologies. The European 
Commission is due to announce its formal decision on the choice of 
technology for the EU in 2018.           
   
This is in addition to non time-sensitive applications ranging from 
performance updates and alerts on wear and tear of components, through 
advice on where to park or how to avoid congestion, to usage-based 
insurance charging.  
 
The connected car market is fought over by automotive 
manufacturers/OEMs, tech companies and mobile operators – acting 
separately in a  combination of  modes. A key issue is whether the OEM 
has the car-owner interface, and organises connectivity, or whether the 
MNO takes the initiative of selling a monthly subscription service which 
gives the owner an interface with an aggregated set of connected car 
service providers.  
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It is foreseeable that the next stage – autonomous vehicles – will involve 
a much wider range of connectivity, including vehicle to vehicle and 
vehicle to environment. Given that autonomous vehicles are likely to 
come into operation in due course, and given the ‘path dependence’ of 
digitalisation within a sector, there is a lot to play for. 
 
 
5. Structural implications for mobile 
 
This section considers the structural implications of the expansive version 
of 5G described above. It first considers the narrower impact on the radio 
access network, backhaul,  and core networks, then the broader effect of a 
much more extensive digital transformation.  
 
The densification of the network will require, particularly in Europe and  
the US, investment in a substantial number of new small cells. In the US, 
the FCC has taken steps to reduce regulatory barriers to the installation of 
such cells, which are said to account for up to one third of their costs. 
new cells remain however, a considerable financial burden.  
 
One solution which has been raised in that country, at the National 
Security Council in the context of strategic global economic rivalry rather 
than that of communications regulation, is the co-ordination or even the 
financing of a monopoly 5G network by the US government (Axios 
2018). This would, it is argued, allow the speedy construction of a wide 
area densified network. The implementation of this solution seems a very 
long shot in the US, but the airing of the possibility is a recognition that, 
whereas hitherto mobile networks have been multiplied without incurring 
exorbitant cost, a fully densified mobile network will approximate more 
closely than its predecessors to the cost conditions of a ‘natural 
monopoly’. It is also reported that, with government blessing,  South 
Korean mobile operators and an internet service provider will share 
the costs and the use of 5G infrastructure deployment. The initiative 
is expected to generate savings of nearly USD 940 million over ten 
years (Telecompaper, 2018).  
 
A less radical approach is to allow or encourage concentration or 
monopoly at the small cell level only, with points of interconnection with 
individual of MNOs at suitable locations. 
   
Investment in 3G and 4G networks has already created a powerful 
stimulus, increasingly tolerated by competition authorities, towards the 
sharing of towers and other passive assets, and in some instances of 
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active components. The installation of small cells imposes different 
challenges than traditional longer-range mobile base stations, but local 
planning type regulatory restrictions are likely to continue to be a 
prominent factor in many jurisdictions. 
 
These factors are likely to create further pressure to merge RANs. A 
balance may have to be struck between the cost savings which 
combinations of networks may lead to and the loss of competition and the 
closer regulation which such combinations would entail.  
 
The numerous small cells will also require backhaul facilities, which will 
rely principally on fixed fibre networks; in countries with ubiquitous 
fixed networks these are already installed to provide fibre to the home 
(FTTH) or fibre to the node (FTTN) networks. Using these networks to 
provide additional backhaul from mobile cells could represent a major 
economy.  
 
This economy of scope is not widely realised under 4G. In relation to the 
European Union, a BEREC report on fixed mobile convergence (BEREC 
2017) addressed the question of whether arrangements for mobile 
backhaul are currently satisfactory, and whether they will be so in the era 
of 5G. On the latter question it concluded that: ‘According to most 
operators, fibre links will be necessary in order to meet the increasing 
data traffic over mobile networks and to meet the requirements in terms 
of latency, bandwidth and throughput in a 5G context’, and that small cell 
backhaul solutions might differ from those for macro cell deployments. 
While spectrum-based solutions to the new challenges exist, ‘the fibre 
optical solution is currently considered the most compelling as well as 
promising one’ (BEREC 2017, page 15). In this connection, New Street 
Research (2018, page 11) reports that in the US  Sprint has agreed terms 
of access to the plant of two US cable operators to deploy its small cells 
at low incremental cost.  
 
The proliferation of connections to small cells (where they have to be 
constructed de novo) therefore implies increased demand for backhaul, 
which might be met by new players and entail less self-supply by MNOs.  
 
In relation to core networks too, the growth of demand for network 
services with different  characteristics in terms of speed, latency etc. will 
increasingly be met by network slicing, possibly by means of the ‘multi-
tenancy’ arrangement discussed below. But another important factor is 
the growth of content distribution networks or CDNs. 
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These involve the placing of major internet access points around 
the world and the use of a special routing code that redirects a Web 
page request to the closest server. When the Web user clicks on 
a URL which is content-delivery enabled, the content delivery 
network re-routes that user's request away from the site's 
originating server to a cache server closer to the user. The cache 
server determines what content in the request exists in the cache, 
serves that content, and retrieves any non-cached content from the 
originating server. Any new content is also cached locally. Other 
than faster loading times, the process is generally not transparent to 
the user, except that the URL served may be different from the one 
requested (Stocker et al. 2017). 
The significance of CDNs is demonstrated by the fact that ‘with the 
emergence of popular video-streaming services that deliver Internet 
video to the TV and other device endpoints, CDNs have prevailed 
as a dominant method to deliver such content. Globally, 70 percent 
of all Internet traffic will cross CDNs by 2021, up from 52 percent 
in 2016. Globally, 77 percent of all Internet video traffic will cross 
CDNs by 2021, up from 67 percent in 2016’ (Cisco Visual 
Networking Index (2017). 
The principal effect is to make the backbone partly redundant, rather than 
to duplicate the local access network. But while some specialized firms 
are active in the CDN business, so are some content providers. Google for 
example is going into the business of constructing long-haul networks 
and laying undersea cables. With the growth of software defined 
networks, such content providers could seek access to a ‘slice’ of an 
ISP’s network, thus creating a bespoke ‘virtual’ local access network and 
controlling acquiring end-to-end access to its customers. It could then 
‘zero-rate’ its co-owned content to its heart’s content.  
 
This process would exemplify an extension of network slicing into a form 
of ‘multi-tenancy’, in which a network can provide a bespoke service to a 
wholesale customer offering a particular set of services related, for 
example, to the automotive or health sector. Following Lemstra (2018), 
the term virtual MNO is used to describe such provision. A UK precursor 
of this kind can be seen by the country’s emergency services ‘taking 
space’ on a commercial MNO. Google Fi, a wifi-based network which 
uses contracts with MNOs to provide additional coverage, is another 
communications service example. Generalising these examples, a 
network becomes not a consumer service and not a single ‘dumb’ pipe, 
but a series of discrete ‘made to order’ pipes, possibly sitting alongside 
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the purely communications service for domestic customers which is  
recognisable today. 
 
Putting these possible developments together, it is possible to envisage a 
future structure of the mobile sector in which 
 
At the horizontal level: 
 
- RANs: fewer operators or more sharing of active or passive 
components especially in the large number of commercially 
marginal areas 
- backhaul networks: more sharing between mobile and fixed 
networks, and additional competitors  
- core networks: increasing use of CDNs 
- content and applications: a) the proliferation of additional 
services in which the weight of communications services in value 
added is limited; b) increasing competition between MNOs and 
verticals in supplying these services to end users. 
 
In relation to vertical integration: 
 
- the possibility of stand-alone RANs; RAN and core networks: 
untying the current combined provision of the two functions by 
MNOs 
- content and services: allowing increasingly variegated digital 
service providers to use network sharing and multi-tenancy to piece 
together their own virtual networks by buying wholesale inputs 
from network operators.   
 
 
6. Regulatory implications  
 
There is one respect in which the world projected here clearly risks 
generating additional regulatory problems, and that is the RAN, where 
pressures to consolidate look strong.  
 
Recent mobile merger activity in Europe has focussed on four to three 
mergers between vertically integrated operators, although at the same 
time further entry has been accomplished in other countries, such as  
Australia, Singapore and Japan. The ‘efficiency defence’ for such 
mergers has been that the presence of the merged entity in the market 
place generates a faster roll-out of 4G networks and leads to a lower 
quality-adjusted price of services. That argument would no doubt be 
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appealed to more strongly in the case of 5G densification – the costs of 
which are likely to be very large, although this will be accompanied by a 
much expanded demand for additional new network services required by 
the digital transformation, particularly in machine-type communications 
and high-speed and low latency applications.  
 
It is difficult to predict how it will play out. But the European regulatory 
framework for electronic communications services, in the form of the 
projected European Electronic Communications Code due to be adopted  
in 2018 (European Commission, 2016b), with its revised focus on 
regulating oligopolies, should be able to cope with it, even it imposes  
more intrusive regulation of RANs in the form of mandated access and 
price regulation of the wholesale access services which content and 
application providers might seek.  
 
This assessment might have to take place within the framework of 
vertical structure containing more competitive and heterogeneous players 
in backhaul and core networks, generated by the changes foreshadowed 
above. This may lead to commercial pressures on existing mobile 
operators to separate themselves as a more specialised AN operator.   
 
Regulators might also be confronted with the prospect of mobile and 
fixed operators being relegated to a different role in parallel with their 
traditional one, as sellers of variegated network components to service 
providers which will own and control the relationship with the customer. 
This will require market analyses with a different focus and different 
level of countervailing market power than is exhibited at present. 
 
Finally, the developments described above are likely to require a review 
of current net neutrality regimes, to the extent that they outlaw the 
provision by ISPs of bespoke services to particular content and 
application providers.    
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